This paper presents both a new approach to studying the consequences of accounting choice and a unique sample to examine the effects of accounting choice in the R&D context. We investigate the effect of firms' decision to capitalize R&D expenditures on the amount of information about future earnings reflected in current stock returns, as captured by the association between currentyear returns and future earnings (FERC). We use a sample of U.K. firms, which includes both R&D capitalizers and expensers. An important feature of our tests is our use of a two equation system to control for the endogeneity of the accounting choice. One equation is a Logit model to empirically explain how firms make this choice. The other is a returns regression that uses the predicted values from the Logit model as a control, in order to isolate the effect of capitalization on informativeness. Proponents of capitalization claim that it enables management to better communicate information about the success of projects and their probable future benefits. Consistent with this, we find that capitalization is associated with higher FERC than expensing.
I. Introduction
In this paper, we present both a new approach to studying the consequences of accounting choice, and we use a unique sample to examine the effects of accounting choice in the R&D context. We examine whether capitalization of R&D expenditures is associated with more informative stock prices, relative to expensing R&D. We define stock price informativeness as the amount of information about future earnings that is reflected in current period stock returns, as captured by the association between current-year returns and future earnings. We use a sample that includes both R&D capitalizers and expensers. Almost all other R&D studies (with the primary exceptions of and Green, Stark and Thomas (1996) and Aboody and Lev (1998) ) only include expensers. Our investigation is important, because as Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001) discuss in their review of the accounting choice literature during the 1990's, the consequences of accounting choice are largely unknown.
The R&D accounting choice is an important choice to study, because there has been much debate about the pros and cons of capitalization (Lev and Sougiannis (1996) , Lev and Zarowin (1999) , Healy, Myers, and Howe (2002) ). Moreover, for firms that engage in R&D activities, R&D expenditures are likely to have a material impact on their earnings and stock returns. So, if there are stock price effects associated with the capitalize vs expense choice, these effects may be statistically detectable.
We use a sample of U.K. firms that engaged in R&D activities during the 1990s. While R&D capitalization is not allowed in the U.S. (except in the case of the software industry -SFAS #86), it is an available alternative in the U.K. 1 Having capitalizers in our sample is critical, 2 1 SSAP #13 allows for the capitalization of development expenditures provided that they meet five conditions (which generally requires that management is satisfied that the expenditures go towards creating a commercially because R&D studies on U.S. firms, such as Lev and Sougiannis (1996) , Monahan (1999) , Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) , Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson (2002) , Healy, Myers, and Howe (2002) , and Lev, Nissim, and Thomas (2002) must hypothesize the unobservable effects of capitalization on R&D expensers, but we can actually observe and test hypotheses about the consequences of capitalization. Since the U.K. capital market is a well developed, liquid market that is similar to the U.S. (as well as to the stock markets of other developed nations), our results might be generalized to other countries. 2 We measure informativeness as the coefficient on future earnings in a regression of current stock return against current and future earnings. We refer to this as the future earnings response coefficient, FERC. Ceteris paribus, firms whose stock returns reflect more information about future earnings have higher stock price informativeness, and thus higher FERC. Our tests are based on those in Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and Lundholm and Myers (2002) , who relate measures of voluntary corporate disclosure to the FERC. In their case, the disclosure metric was based on analysts' rankings. In our case, the disclosure metric is based on the R&D accounting method.
The relation between R&D capitalization and stock price informativeness is important for both academics and policymakers, because it addresses the fundamental issues of whether and how accounting matters. In the U.S., there has recently been much debate about the potential benefits of R&D capitalization. For example, Lev and Zarowin (1999) argue that capitalization enables better matching of R&D costs and benefits, thus providing more information for financial statement users, and Healy, Myers, and Howe (2002) show that successful efforts viable product / service). Research expenditures must be expensed in the period incurred. See section 4 for more detail on SSAP # 13.
capitalization can provide information benefits relative to immediate expensing. The central point is that capitalization, by providing information about the percentage of outlays capitalized vs expensed and about the period of amortization, enables management to communicate information about the success of projects and their probable future benefits. This information is not recognized under expensing; thus, capitalization can lead to more informative stock prices.
For example, Hughes and Kao (1991) argue that capitalization is more informative than expensing, because it requires estimates of future benefits and auditor verification of such estimates, and Vigeland (1981) argues that the switch to full expensing of R&D in the U.S. under SFAS # 2 reduced the amount of information available, since it is difficult for the market to estimate the unobserved capitalized benefits. Lev and Sougiannis' (1996) and Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis' (2001) findings of excess returns to R&D intensive firms in the U.S. is consistent with this view, because the lack of capitalization makes it difficult to evaluate these firms, thus leading to market inefficiencies.
On the other hand, capitalization might not result in more informative (efficient) prices for at least three reasons. First, the market may doubt management's information, based on the belief that management is manipulating earnings for its own benefit, such as in the case of an earnings-based bonus plan. Since the success of R&D activities is so difficult to measure and forecast, the auditing system does not necessarily alleviate such concerns. Second, even if management is honest, and this can be attested, the high uncertainty of R&D activities may render the ex-ante information made available by capitalization relatively worthless, since this information relies on estimates based on future projections. In this view, even the best forecast is a poor one. Third, even if management is honest and R&D capitalization information is reliable, expensers can simply disclose the information, as an alternative to balance sheet recognition (although such disclosure is not costless, since it might reveal proprietary information). Thus, whether or not capitalization provides information benefits to the market, resulting in more informative prices, is ultimately an empirical question, which this paper seeks to answer. If R&D capitalization makes stock prices more informative, capitalizing firms should have higher FERC, ceteris paribus.
A fundamental issue for any test of the effects of accounting choice is self-selection (endogeneity of the choice; Watts and Zimmerman (1990), Skinner (1993) ). This is especially important here, because the decision to capitalize vs expense R&D is endogenous and is associated with factors that affect the relation between current returns and future earnings. In particular, capitalizers are "early life cycle" firms, while expensers are more "mature" firms, and more mature firms have a stronger returns-earnings relation. Thus, a crucial feature of our tests is that we use a two equation system to control for the endogeneity of the accounting choice. One equation is a Logit model to empirically explain how firms make this choice. The other is a returns regression that uses the predicted values from the Logit model as a control, in order to isolate the effect of capitalization on informativeness.
Using a sample of firms from the U.K.'s three largest R&D industries (based on number of firms with R&D outlays) during the 1990's, we regress current returns against current and future earnings for R&D capitalizers and expensers (with capitalizers' earnings re-stated to be on an as-if expense basis, so the earnings of the two groups are comparable), and we compare the coefficients on the future earnings. We find that capitalization is associated with higher FERC than expensing. While we remain cautious in drawing strong inferences or policy implications given the short time period and small number of industries, our results suggest that capitalization is more informative than expensing, as capitalization's proponents have suggested. Thus, we provide the first empirical evidence that an accounting choice may affect the amount of information about future earnings reflected in stock returns. In summary, we contribute both a new approach to studying the effects of accounting choice and a unique sample to test the effects of accounting choice in the R&D context.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research on accounting choice and R&D capitalization. Section 3 discusses our measure of stock price informativeness and the test methodology. Section 4 discusses the data and sample. Section 5
reports the results of the empirical tests. Section 6 concludes.
Relation to Prior Research
Our study is at the intersection of two research streams: research on the consequences of accounting choice and research on the value relevance of R&D capitalization. As summarized by Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001) , research on the consequences of accounting choice has focused on the stock market's reaction to a given choice, as evidenced by abnormal returns around the time of the decision. The maintained hypothesis, based on market efficiency, is that if the choice does not have an effect on cash flows, there should be no abnormal stock returns. In general, this is what has been found. Motivated by Watts and Zimmerman's (1978, 1986) positive accounting theory, studies also focused on examining stock price effects related to debt covenants, incentive compensation, or political costs. In general, the issues were never really resolved, and the economic consequences of accounting choices are mostly unknown.
Our tests contrast with those based on the abnormal returns methodology, and our approach has a number of advantages over calculating abnormal returns. The value-relevance of recognized intangibles has been examined by Green, Stark, and Thomas (1996) , Ely and Waymire (1999) , and Barth and Clinch (1998 Tobin (1982) refers to improvement in efficiency of resource allocation as functional efficiency. Durnev, et. al. (2003) discuss the link between informational efficiency and functional efficiency. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) , Monahan (1999) , Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) , Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson (2002) , Healy, Myers, and Howe (2002) , and Lev, Nissim, and Thomas (2002) examine the value relevance of capitalized R&D for U.S. firms, and universally find that the stock market treats R&D as an asset. However, these papers must hypothesize the unobservable effects of capitalization on R&D expensers, since R&D capitalization is not allowed in the U.S. Thus, by definition, they cannot compare the effects of capitalization vs. expensing.
Perhaps the closest papers to ours are Loudder and Behn (1995) and Aboody and Lev (1998 Ours is the first study to examine the consequences of accounting choice in terms of its affects on stock price informativeness. Thus, this paper presents a new approach to studying the effects of accounting choice.
Measure of Stock Price Informativeness
Our stock price informativeness measure (how much information about future earnings is capitalized into price) is based on Collins, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (CKSS, 1994) . CKSS assume revisions in expected dividends to be correlated with revisions in expected earnings, which allows them to express current stock returns as a function of the current period's unexpected earnings and (discounted) changes in expected future earnings. Of course, the expectations imbedded in the returns are unobservable. The goal of this paper is to see whether 9 the market's future earnings expectations, as implied in stock returns, are closer to future earnings realizations for firms that capitalize R&D costs; i.e., whether capitalization results in current returns that are more highly associated with future earnings. CKSS proxy for current unexpected earnings using observed current change in earnings, and for changes in expected future earnings using changes in reported future earnings. This results in a regression of current annual stock returns, R t on current and future annual earnings changes (firm subscripts omitted):
where the earnings variables are in per share form and are scaled by the share price at the beginning of the current year (to avoid having to delete firms with negative or zero beginning-ofperiod earnings), and the stock returns are total annual stock returns, defined as capital gain plus dividend yield (measured over the period from nine months prior to fiscal year end to three months after fiscal year end).
Using earnings changes as explanatory variables assumes that earnings follow a random walk. Rather than impose this condition, we follow Lundholm and Myers (2002) and estimate the levels form of the regression: We show only one future year for ease of exposition. Liu and Thomas (2000) estimate a model similar to (1) using analysts forecasts as proxies for market expectations. We use actual future earnings as the regressors and not analysts' forecasts, because we want to know how much information about future earnings is reflected in current returns (i.e., how close future earnings realizations are to the unobservable expectations implicit in stock prices).
referred to as the contemporaneous ERC, is also hypothesized to be positive, and b 0 is hypothesized to be negative.
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In order to make the regression results comparable for capitalizers and expensers, we adjust capitalizers' earnings to be on a "pro-forma" expense basis. We construct capitalizers' pro-forma earnings by subtracting the excess (or adding the deficit) after-tax amount of development costs capitalized minus amortization expense, from reported net income.
CKSS argue that using the actual future earnings introduces an error in variables bias in estimates of the future earnings coefficients, since the theoretically correct regressor is the unobservable expected future earnings. To help mitigate the errors in variables bias, we follow CKSS and include the future return as a control variable and estimate the model:
The hypothesized coefficient on R t+1 is negative. Based on CKSS's evidence that the relation between current returns and future earnings is statistically insignificant beyond three years, we follow them and use a three year future earnings horizon. Based on Lundholm and Myers, we aggregate all three years into one future variable, for ease of exposition. Lundholm and Myers show that their results are unchanged whether the three future years are entered separately or aggregated.
We compare the future earnings response coefficient, between capitalizers and expensers.
The null hypothesis is that FERC is equal for both groups. If capitalizers' FERC is greater than expensers' FERC, then capitalization of R&D is associated with more informative stock prices.
Our tests are based on those in Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and Lundholm and Myers (2002) , who
show that increased voluntary disclosure results in higher FERC, implying that the disclosure reveals information that results in returns impounding more information about future earnings. In their case, the disclosure metric was based on analysts' rankings. In our case, the disclosure metric is based on the R&D accounting choice. 8 We compare FERC for capitalizers vs expensers separately for each industry in our sample. Estimation by industry is important, because R&D activities are industry specific; thus R&D intensive firms are likely to be homogeneous within an industry and heterogeneous across industries. Conducting tests on similar firms in an industry decreases the probability of omitted correlated variables driving the results. Indeed, literally by definition, firms in a given industry are buffeted by the same economic shocks, have similar production and sales cycles, and tend to use similar accounting methods. By conducting an intra-industry analysis, we can control for these economic and accounting factors (without having to use potentially noisy proxy variables), and thereby focus on the effect on FERC of differences in information between capitalization and expensing.
Data and Sample
We examine U.K. firms because U.K. GAAP permits, but does not require, the capitalization and subsequent amortization of development expenditures if five conditions are met: (1) There is a clearly defined project; (2) The related expenditure is separately identifiable;
(3) The outcome of the project is examined for its technical feasibility and its ultimate commercial viability considered in light of factors such as likely market conditions (including competing products), public opinion, and consumer and environmental legislation; (4) The aggregate of deferred development costs, any further development costs, and related production, 12 8 Other recent papers using the informativeness measure are Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003), Ayres and Freeman (2001) , Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2002) , and Piotroski and Roulstone (2002 9 We also require data on industry membership, earnings, number of shares outstanding and corporate tax rate (lagged, contemporaneous and the subsequent three years), stock price and stock return (contemporaneous annual return and the subsequent three-year buy-and-hold return) to be available on Datastream. Removal of inappropriate observations and observations with missing data reduces the sample to 3,091 firm-year observations (520 firms). We classify each firm-year observation as a capitalizer in that year if the firm reported either a non-zero value for the R&D asset or a non-zero amount for R&D amortization; otherwise the firm-year observation is classified as an expenser. Finally, since we perform our analysis by industry, we use the top 13 9 For example, for firms in the mining industry, Datastream often reports a positive amount for the firm's R&D asset; however, upon examination it is apparent that the amount reported relates to an exploration asset, not R&D. Similarly, for many firms in the Oil and Gas industry, the R&D asset relates to exploration and development. This indicates that the policy of capitalization generally increases reported earnings.
11 10 We measure leverage as total debt divided by book value of equity (converted to as-if-expense for capitalizers) R&D intensity is measured as the total amount expended on R&D (equal to R&D expense for the expensers and R&D expense plus the amount added to the R&D asset for the capitalizers) divided by total assets (converted to an 'as-if expense' basis for the capitalizers). We measure the market-to-book ratio as the market value of equity divided by book value of equity, converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers. We measure beta as the market model beta calculated using monthly returns ending in the month of the firm's fiscal year end (requiring a minimum of 12 months and maximum of 60 months of returns) and the FTSE All Share Index.
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11 Pro-forma (or 'as-if-expense') earnings are the earnings that would have been reported had the firm followed a policy of fully expensing R&D expenditures. We construct capitalizers' pro-forma earnings by subtracting the excess (or adding the deficit) after-tax amount of development costs capitalized minus amortization expense, from reported net income. Even if capitalizers do not report the amount of development costs capitalized, we can compute the pro-forma operating profit, because the difference between the amount capitalized and the amortization expense equals the change in the reported R&D asset balance.
Overall, Table 2 shows that capitalizers are younger, smaller, riskier, and less profitable than expensers, characteristics typical of "early life cycle" firms. This is consistent with Skinner (1993), who finds that larger firms tend to use income decreasing accounting methods, and with Lev, Sarath, and Sougiannis (1999) , and Beaver and Ryan (2000) , who show that for early life cycle firms, measured profitability is higher under capitalization, which might explain their capitalization decision.
These group differences are important for our tests, because they indicate that the choice to capitalize or expense is endogenous, and is associated with firm characteristics that affect FERC. In addition to informativeness, the primary determinants of the relation between current returns and future earnings are earnings timeliness and forecastability (variability). Earnings that are less timely have a weaker relation with contemporaneous returns, but a stronger relation with lagged returns, because price impounds information instantaneously, but the accounting system recognizes it with a lag. Earnings that are more variable (uncertain, difficult to forecast) have a weaker relation with (lagged) returns, because price reflects the market's forecast.
Timeliness and forecastability are related to size, profitability, and earnings variability.
Smaller firms have a poorer information environment than larger firms, poor profitability is associated with lower earnings persistence, and more variable earnings are less persistent, riskier and harder to forecast.
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In summary, capitalizers' characteristics imply that they should have a lower FERC than expensers, absent any information advantage due to capitalization. In order to isolate the effect of capitalization on FERC, we must control for the endogeneity of the capitalization vs expensing decision.
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Empirical Tests and Results
Explaining the Capitalize vs Expense Choice
As pointed out above, a crucial issue for any test of the effects of accounting choice is self selection (endogeneity of the accounting choice). In our case, the issue is that firms self select as expensers vs capitalizers based on factors that are associated with the relation between current returns and future earnings, and we must control for these factors (Watts and Zimmerman (1990), Skinner (1993) ). In particular, Section 4 discussed evidence that capitalizers are earlier life cycle firms than expensers, and that less mature firms have a weaker returnsearnings relation than more mature firms.
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To control for the endogeneity, we estimate a two equation system. One equation is a
Logit equation that models the capitalization vs expense choice. The other equation regresses returns against current and future earnings for capitalizers and expensers, using the fitted values from the Logit equation to control for the self selection.
Our Logit model explains the capitalization vs expense decision as a function of a firm's life cycle. As pointed out above, relating the accounting choice to the firm's life cycle is consistent with Lev, Sarath, and Sougiannis (1999) , and Beaver and Ryan (2000) , who show that the effects of capitalization on measured profitability is related to the firm's life cycle stage.
As empirical proxies to capture life cycle, we use six explanatory variables in our Logit model: earnings variability (a measure of risk and persistence), profitability, firm size (market 17 13 Another way to deal with selection bias is to examine the change in FERC for firms that switch methods, so that each firm acts as its own control. We did not do this, because there are only 25 switchers (an average of 8 per industry), so the sample size is small. Moreover, with only a ten year sample period, either the pre or post switch period (or both) is too short to reliably estimate FERC. We re-estimated our regressions after eliminating switchers. The results, not shown in the interest of brevity, are very similar to our main results.
value of equity), the market-to-book ratio (a measure of risk and growth), R&D intensity, and While there are many potential proxies, we use these because it is well known that they are related to timeliness and forecastability, which determine FERC. For example, Lundholm and Myers (2002) control for risk, growth, persistence, profitability, and size in their study of disclosure and FERC. R&D intensity relates to timeliness and forecastability, because greater 14 Our Logit model is similar to Aboody and Lev's (1998) , who use size, profitability, R&D intensity, beta, and leverage as explanatory variables. We did not include leverage, because Oswald (2004) finds that leverage is not a significant determinant of the R&D capitalize vs expense choice for U.K. firms. As a robustness test, we reestimated the Logit model adding leverage, and our results were virtually unchanged. For example, Φ 8 , in Table 4 the coefficient on CAP t *E t+τ , is .34 (Z=2.93) and .25 (Z=2.77) for the full and excluded samples, respectively. In addition, although we suggest in section I that earnings-based bonus plans may provide an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings for their own benefit, we are unable to control for this factor in our analysis. Information pertaining to the composition of bonus plans is unavailable for our entire time-series. 15 Skinner uses the term "investment opportunity set" (IOS) to capture firm type. Similar to us, he uses R&D intensity and q (which is related to the M/B ratio) as proxies for IOS.
18 16 We also calculated the earnings variance as σ 2 (∆EPS t /P t-1 ), with very similar results.
R&D intensity is associated with more variable earnings (Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone, 2002) and with higher growth. We control for Beta, as a proxy for the firm's discount rate, because the coefficient on earnings is related to the rate at which earnings are discounted (Collins and Kothari, 1989) . Table 3 reports the results of our Logit models. We estimate separate models for each industry, because the nature of R&D activities is industry specific. To avoid overfitting, we emphasize parsimony and use the above six explanatory variables for each industry, rather than 
Results of Returns Regression
The returns regression uses the fitted values from the Logit model as the control for endogeneity:
+ Φ 4 R t+τ + Φ 5 CAP t + Φ 6 CAP t *E t-1 + Φ 7 CAP t E t + Φ 8 CAP t *E t+τ + Φ 9 CAP t *R t+τ + Φ 10 PCAP t + Φ 11 PCAP t *E t-1 + Φ 12 PCAP t E t + Φ 13 PCAP t *E t+τ + Φ 14 PCAP t *R t+τ + µ t (5) where CAP t is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is classified as a capitalizer in year t, zero otherwise, and PCAP is the fitted probability of expensing from the Logit model. The 19 estimated coefficient on CAP t *E t+τ (Φ 8 ) represents the incremental stock price informativeness for capitalizers relative to expensers.
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Although we are primarily interested in the coefficients on future earnings, we include interactive coefficients (for both CAP and CTRL) on all of the regressors, thereby allowing all of the coefficients to vary by group and by the control variable. If the other coefficients do vary, but are constrained to be equal, any difference in FERC that we estimate might be due to the inappropriate restriction. On the other hand, if the coefficients on the other variables do not vary, estimating additional parameters decreases the power of the test, which weakens our ability to find a relation between accounting choice and informativeness.
Results of estimating equation (5) are reported in Table 4 , which reports mean coefficients across the industries, and the Z statistic (Barth, 1994) for testing whether the mean coefficient is significantly different from zero.
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The average ERC (Φ 2 ) and FERC (Φ 3 ) are significantly positive, and the average coefficients on lagged earnings (Φ 1 ) and future returns (Φ 4 ) are significantly negative, as expected. The signs on the coefficients on the PCAP*E t and PCAP*E t+τ interactive terms (Φ 12 and Φ 13 ) are negative as expected, since as pointed out above, capitalizers are riskier firms, and thus should have lower ERC and FERC. Most important, the mean incremental FERC is positive (Φ 8 =0.41) and highly statistically significant (Z=3.38). 18 In their returns regression, Aboody and Lev (1998) also use the fitted probability from the capitalization choice equation to control for endogeneity of the capitalization decision. We also used returns measured over months (-12, 0) relative to the fiscal year end. Very similar results are found. To remove extreme observations, we windsorize R t , E t , E t-1 , E t+τ , and R t+τ at the top / bottom 1%, and we remove observations with studentized residuals greater than two.
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19 The Z statistics assume that the industry regressions are independent. However, since the regressions are all estimated over the same time period, they might not be independent. To check our independence assumption, we estimate the regressions with fixed time effects, and the results are very similar. The Z statistic also assumes that the coefficients' standard errors are unbiased. This is a reasonable assumption, since the regressions are run by industry. In effect, all observations are relative to their industry mean, as in an industry index model, so that common industry effects are removed [Bernard (1987) ]. Results for the individual industries are available from the authors on request.
This result shows that capitalization is associated with more informative stock prices than expensing. This is the first empirical evidence that an accounting method choice is associated with the amount of information about future fundamentals reflected in current stock returns.
Robustness Tests -Excluding Mandatory Expensers
In our tests so far, we have implicitly assumed that for our expenser firms, the five conditions for capitalization have been met and that managers choose not to capitalize. 20 However, some firms are forced to expense (mandatory expensers), because their R&D expenditures do not meet the criteria for capitalization; i.e., the payoffs from their R&D expenditures are less certain than those of the capitalizers, so it is questionable whether an asset is created by the R&D expenditures. By definition, mandatory expensers are less successful in their R&D endeavors than capitalizers or optional expensers.
Inclusion of mandatory expensers biases our results in favor of a positive Φ 8 coefficient (i.e., a higher FERC for capitalizers). This is because the capitalizers have more certain R&D payoffs, so their FERC would have been higher even if they had expensed. To correct for this bias, we must eliminate expensers who could not capitalize, so that we only include the optional expensers. Then, we can compare capitalizers vs expensers that are both successful in their R&D activities. Although we cannot observe whether expensers meet the five capitalization conditions, we can proxy for the success of their R&D endeavors by the ratio:
There are a number of reasons why management may chose not to capitalize development expenditures which meet the five criteria outlined in SSAP #13. First, it may be costly to deviate from analyst preferences (AIMR, 1991) . Second, managers may be concerned about the quality of current and future earnings (Freeburn, 1998) . Finally, there are measurement and record keeping costs associated with capitalizing development expenditures (Nixon and Lonnie, 1990 ).
The numerator is an estimate of the unrecognized economic asset created by the R&D expenditures (capitalizers' BV is adjusted to BV under expensing). Since by definition, more successful R&D firms create greater economic assets per pound of R&D expenditure, more successful firms have a higher value of the ratio, and mandatory expensers should have lower ratios than optional expensers or capitalizers. Confirming the efficacy of R&D_Value as a measure of R&D success (and thus as a filter for mandatory expensers), we find that for each industry in our sample for all years, expensers have the lowest values of the ratio.
Since a higher value of the ratio indicates greater success, we define mandatory expensers as expensers with either a negative R&D_Value (from MV < BV) or an R&D_Value ratio lower than the lowest capitalizer, for each industry-year. To correct for the bias, we delete mandatory expensers from our tests. This ensures that all remaining expensers were at least as successful in their R&D endeavors as the least successful capitalizer, and so these remaining expensers likely have met the five capitalization conditions. Table 1, Panel B shows the industry breakdown of the optional expensers. In total, this filter deleted 270 of the original 908 expensers (30%).
Column 2 of Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (5) on the reduced sample.
Although the coefficient of CAP t *E t+τ (Φ 8 ) is lower compared to the full sample, it is still significantly positive (Z = 2.50), supporting the effect of capitalization on stock price informativeness.
Conclusion
We have examined whether capitalization of R&D expenditures is associated with more informative stock prices, relative to expensing R&D, where stock price informativeness is defined as the amount of information about future earnings that is reflected in current period stock returns. We measure informativeness as the coefficient on future earnings in a regression of current stock return against current and future earnings, which we refer to as the future earnings response coefficient, FERC. Ceteris paribus, firms whose stock returns reflect more information about future earnings have higher stock price informativeness, and higher FERC.
An important feature of our tests is control for self-selection, because the decision to capitalize vs expense R&D is endogenous and is associated with factors that affect the relation between current returns and future earnings. In particular, capitalizers are "early life cycle" firms, while expensers are more "mature" firms, and more mature firms have a stronger returnsearnings relation. We use a two equation system to control for the endogeneity of the accounting choice. One equation is a Logit model to empirically explain how firms make this choice. The other equation is a returns regression that uses the predicted values from the Logit model as a control, in order to isolate the effect of capitalization on informativeness.
We find that capitalization is associated with greater stock price informativeness (higher FERC). Thus, our results provide the first empirical evidence consistent with the proposition that capitalization of R&D provides more information (about future earnings) to the market, as capitalization's proponents have suggested. It is important to remember, however, that our tests are based on three industries over one decade. Also, due to the length of our sample, we are limited to a three year horizon, which does not capture all of the benefits of R&D that require a longer gestation period. Moreover, as Holthausen and Watts (2001) discuss, in order to advocate a policy of R&D capitalization from our results, we would need a theory of standard setting. For these reasons, we remain cautious in drawing strong inferences or policy implications from our evidence.
In summary, we contribute both a new approach to studying the effects of accounting choice and a unique sample to test the effects of accounting choice in the R&D context. Application of our approach to other accounting choices and examination of the effects of R&D capitalization using both R&D expensers and capitalizers represent promising avenues for future research.
Watts, Ross and J. Zimmerman, 1978 The sample consists of U.K. firms who disclosed either a R&D asset or R&D expense in any year t=1993-1999, with the following data available on Datastream: industry membership, earnings, number of shares outstanding and corporate tax rate (lagged, contemporaneous and the subsequent three years), stock price and stock return (contemporaneous annual return and the subsequent three-year buy-and-hold return). We also require firms to be in one of the top three R&D industries (defined by number of firm-year observations). A firm-year observation is defined as a Capitalizer if in that year the firm reported either a non-zero value for the R&D asset or a non-zero amount for R&D amortization; otherwise the firm-year observation is classified as an Expenser. Industry classifications are based on Datastream Level 4 classifications.
b The Excluded Sample removes expensers that are the most likely to not be able to capitalize. Specifically, we exclude expensers with either a negative RD_Value ratio or an RD_Value ratio smaller than the smallest positive RD_Value Ratio for the capitalizers within the same industryyear. RD_Value Ratio = the difference between market value of equity and book value of equity (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers) divided by R&D expenditure. Two hundred and seventy expenser firm-year observations are removed. Share price per share and market value are measured at the end of the fiscal year. Share price is reported in pounds sterling; market value, sales, assets, book value of equity, earnings, R&D expense and R&D asset are measured in millions of pounds sterling. Reported EPS t-1 , Reported EPS t and Reported EPS t+τ are equal to reported earnings divided by number of shares outstanding for the lagged year, current year and the sum of the future three years' EPS, respectively. Age is the number of years for which Datastream has data on the firm. Market-toBook is market value divided by book value (converted to 'as-if expense' for the capitalizers) measured at fiscal year end. R&D intensity is R&D expenditures divided by total assets (converted to as-if expense for the capitalizers) measured at fiscal year end. Leverage is measured as total debt divided by book value (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers) measured at fiscal year end. EP Variability is earnings variability and is calculated as σ 2 (E t /P t-1 ) using all available data from 1990-2003 (we require a minimum of three observations per firm to estimate variability), where E t is earnings per share in year t and P t-1 is share price at the start of the fiscal year t. Beta is the market model beta calculated using monthly returns ending in the month of the firm's fiscal year end (requiring a minimum of 12 months and maximum of 60 months of returns) and the FTSE All Share Index. b R t is the annual return measured over the period beginning nine months before the end of the fiscal year and ending three months after the fiscal year end in year t. R t+τ is the buy-and-hold return measured over the following three years (measured over months (+3, +39) relative to fiscal year end). E t is earnings divided by shares outstanding for fiscal year t; E t-1 and E t+t are earnings divided by shares outstanding for fiscal year t-1 and the sum of the future three years' EPS, respectively. Earnings per share is as reported for Expensers, and adjusted to 'as-ifexpense' for Capitalizers. All earnings per share numbers are reported in pounds sterling. The Difference column reports the significance levels for F-tests (Wilcoxon tests) comparing the pooled sample mean (median) for the difference between expensers and capitalizers. CAP it = β 0 + β 1 EARN_VAR it + β 2 EARN_SIGN it + β 3 SIZE it + β 4 M/B it + β 4 RDINT it + β 5 BETA it + ε it CAP it = indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i capitalizes development expenditures in year t, 0 otherwise. EARN_VAR it = percentile ranking of firm i's earnings variance within each firm's industry. Earnings variance is calculated as the variance of the firm's earnings per share deflated by share price at the start of the fiscal year, over 1990 -2003 (earnings per share is adjusted to be 'as-if expense' for the capitalizers). EARN_SIGN it = indicator variable equal to 1 if E it is positive, 0 otherwise. SIZE it = percentile ranking of firm i's market value (measured at fiscal year end) within each firm's industry-year. M/B it = percentile ranking of firm i's market-to-book within each firm's industry-year. Market-to-Book is market value divided by book value (converted to as-if expense for the capitalizers) measured at fiscal year end. RDINT it = percentile ranking of firm i's R&D intensity within each firm's industry-year. R&D intensity is R&D expenditures divided by total assets (converted to as-if expense for the capitalizers) measured at fiscal year end. BETA it = percentile ranking of firm i's beta within each firm's industry-year. Beta is the market model beta calculated using monthly returns ending in the month of the firm's fiscal year end (requiring a minimum of 12 months and maximum of 60 months of returns) and the FTSE All Share Index. ε it = residual term for firm i in year t. Chisquare reports the probability from the Wald test. OLS Adjusted R 2 reports is the adjusted rsquare using ordinary least squares estimation of the model. Table 2 for variable definitions. PCAP t = the fitted probability of being a capitalizer (from Table 3 where t j is the t-statistic for industry j, k j is the degrees of freedom for industry j, and N is the number of industries. The 5% (1%) significance levels for Z is 1.645 (1.96).
b The Full Sample column uses all firm-year observations. c
The Excluded Sample removes expensers that are the most likely to not be able to capitalize. Specifically, we exclude expensers with either a negative RD_Value Ratio or a RD_Value smaller than the smallest positive RD Success Ratio for the capitalizers within the same industryyear. RD Success Ratio = the difference between market value of equity and book value of equity (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers) divided by R&D expenditure. Two hundred and seventy expenser firm-year observations are removed.
